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Sexual harassment has been the most dominant workplace issue in the United States in recent years.' The visibility of sexual
harassment has been fostered by the controversial Hill-Thomas
hearings, 2 the Navy "Tailhook" scandal, 3 and recent harassment al-

l See Anna Sobkowski, I've Been Sexually Harassed. How Do I Get Back On Track?,
EXECUTVE FEMALE, July/Aug. 1993, at 59. Sobkowski noted that sexual harassment
has dominated the press more than any other workplace issue in the 1990s. Id.
Although the public tends to focus its attention on the details of each harassment
episode, Sobkowski recognized that there may be a more important concern for sexual harassment victims-"what to do in the aftermath." Id.
2 See Monica L. Sherer, No LongerJust Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX For
Peer Sexual Harassment,141 U. PA. L. REV.2119, 2119-20 (1993) (stating that American
society, due to events such as the Hill-Thomas hearings, has been compelled to confront the issue of workplace sexual harassment); see also Stacy J. Cooper, Comment,
Sexual Harassment and the Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevaluation of the "Hostile Environment"Doctrine,26 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 387, 387 (1993). Cooper recognized that
the October 1991 Thomas hearings were not the first time that the issue of sexual
harassment has been heard by the Senate. Id. (citation omitted). However, these
hearings opened the floodgates to an unprecedented amount of public debate and
commentary on the issue. Id.
Sexual harassment complaints rose 45% in the year following Anita Hill's allegations against now Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. Claudia MacLachlan,
Harassment Charges Up One Year After Hill, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1992, at 7. MacLachlan
noted that Hill, by providing women with the knowledge and courage to speak out,
has caused this surge of grievances. Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported 9953 complaints for the year ending October 1, 1992, an
increase of 2546 claims from the prior year, which ended immediately before the
hearings. Id. Additionally, in the six-month period from October 1, 1991 to March
31, 1992, federal and state employment practice agencies reported an increase of
more than 1600 sexual harassment complaints. Randall Samborn, Bias Law Booms:
Huge Verdicts, New Laws Rock the Employment Litigation Bar, NAT'L L.J., July 27, 1992, at
1.
3 Sherer, supra note 2, at 2119-20 (citing the Tailhook incident as an event that
heightened public awareness of sexual harassment); Eric Schmitt, Wall of Silence Impedes Inquiy Into A Rowdy Navy Convention, N.Y. TiMEs,June 14, 1992, atAl (calling the
incident the "military's most notorious sexual harassment scandal"). In September
1991, hundreds of officers gathered at the 35th annual convention of the Tailhook
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legations against many prominent members of the United States
Senate.4 Public recognition, discussion, and debate have been generated by this volatile issue, leaving many American workers both
outraged and confused as to whether, why, and what type of sexual
harassment actually occurred in certain instances.5
Association, a group comprised of both active-duty and retired naval aviators. Id. In a
hotel hallway, masses of these officers formed a gauntlet, ambushing and assaulting
unsuspecting women. Id. Each evening during the convention, "groups of officers in
civilian dress suddenly turned violent, organizing with military precision into drunken
gangs that shoved terrified women down the gauntlet, grabbing at their breasts and
buttocks and stripping off their clothes." Id. at A34.
In the aftermath of the incident, more than 70 officers were implicated in either
the hotel assaults or in a subsequent cover-up, and the complaints cited at least 26
female victims. Id. One female officer filed a grievance with Rear Adm. John W.
Snyder Jr., who at the time was head of the Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center in
Maryland. Id. It was alleged that Snyder, in response to the officer's complaint, stated
"[t]hat's what you get for going to a hotel party with a bunch of drunk aviators." Id.
The outrage over the "Tailhook" scandal was based upon such responses, and also on
the failure of the Navy's "top brass" to assume responsibility and be held accountable
for the disgraceful event. See Kurt A. Johnson, Military Department General Counsel As
"ChiefLegal Officers": Impact On Delivery Of ImpartialLegal Advice At HeadquartersAnd In
The Field, 139 MIL. L. REv. 1, 75 (1993).
4 See Wandering Hands, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1992, at 27 (recognizing that but
for the Anita Hill testimony at the 1991 hearings, sexual harassment allegations
against senators might never have been exposed). The most serious allegations have
centered around Oregon Senator Bob Packwood, a liberal Republican. Id. Since his
1969 entrance into the Senate, Senator Packwood had been considered a strong ally
of women's rights. Id. It was alleged, however, that for 21 years Senator Packwood
engaged in repeated sexual misconduct toward 10 women lobbyists and staff members. Id. Packwood, after apologizing, underwent treatment to determine whether
alcohol was responsible for his conduct. Id. Other senators have similarly attracted
the harassment spotlight, including Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, who was accused of forcing a woman to engage in sexual relations and was also privately accused of harassment by nine other women; David Durenburger of Minnesota, who was accused of
raping a woman in 1963; and Brock Adams of Washington, who was accused by eight
women complaining that they were harassed and/or drugged by him. Id. A potential
conflict arises, however, because senators are exempt from federal sexual harassment
laws. Id. Two female senators, Dianne Feinstein and Patty Murray, have vowed to
eliminate the exemption. Id.
Many senators have appeared to be insensitive to the issue of sexual harassment.
See, e.g., John Taylor, Men on Trial II, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 16, 1991, at 30. For example,
Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming, implying that Anita Hill's allegations were an
attempt to sabotage Thomas's career, stated "it gets all tangled up in this sexual harassment crap." Id. at 36.
5 See Sobkowski, supra note 1, at 59. In her article, Sobkowski includes advice for
harassment victims from Peter Van Schaick, an employee-rights attorney from Glen
Ridge, NewJersey. Id. at 60-61. Van Schaick recommends that victims of sexual harassment commence litigation only as a final option. Id. at 60. Instead, he maintains,
it is most important for women to "regain a feeling of control." Id. at 61. Consulting
an attorney as an adviser, or having an attorney contact the accuser's employer to
request action, are both recommended by Van Schaick as methods of regaining control. Id. Finally, Van Schaick recognizes that if a victim of sexual harassment can
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Sexual harassment was first recognized as an actionable form
of sex discrimination in 1976.1 Since then, the number of reported
incidents of sexual harassment has risen drastically, 7 with one study
estimating that ninety percent of all working women believe they
have been harassed in the workplace because of their sex.8 In
1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
empowered with enforcing the provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 issued Guidelines' ° recognizing that sexual
learn to effectively negotiate, she can strengthen her ability to control the aftermath
and outcome of a harassing experience. Id.
6 Maria M. Carillo, HostileEnvironment Sexual HarassmentBy A Supervisor Under Title
WI: Reassessment Of Employer Liability In Light Of The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 45 (1992-93) (citations omitted); see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that sexual conduct directed towards a female plaintiff by her supervisor occurred because of her sex and was actionable under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell,
587 F.2d 1240, 1240-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See infra note 66 (quoting Title VII).
The term "sexual harassment" was coined in 1975 by Lin Farley, an activist professor at Cornell University, who taught a course entitled "Women at Work." Peter
Wyden, Sexual Harassment,GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, July 1993, at 121.
7 Anne B. Fisher, Sexual Harassment: What To Do, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 84.
The number of sexual harassment complaints filed with the EEOC almost doubled
from 1988 to 1992, with 10,532 complaints registered in the year 1992 alone. Id. This
number is especially startling in light of a 1991 study conducted by two professors at
the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, which revealed that only two
percent of women in a nationwide survey who admitted being sexually harassed had
filed formal harassment complaints. See id.
Other studies have demonstrated the increased prevalence of workplace sexual
harassment in the U.S. in recent years:
We have reason to believe that verbal and physical sexual harassment is
widespread, with risk estimates for women ranging from about 40-90%.
Perhaps the best data on prevalence comes from a carefully designed,
random-sample survey of Federal government employees in 1981, where
42% of the approximate 10,648 women responding (representing
694,000 federally employed women with an 85% overall return rate)
reported that they had been sexually harassed on the job in the two
years immediately prior to the survey. In the U.S. Merit Systems Study
(1981), 62% of women had experienced severe sexual harassment (e.g.
deliberate touching), and 20% reported actual or attempted rape or
assault.
JEAN A. HAMILTON ET AL., The Emotional Consequences of Gender-Based Abuse in the Workplace: New Counseling Programsfor Sex Discrimination, 1987 WOMEN AND THERAPY 155,
159.
8 See Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical,And Social Implications Of
The "ReasonableWoman" StandardIn Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 773,
803 (1993) (citing David E. Terpstra & Susan E. Cook, Complainant Characteristicsand
Reported Behaviors and Consequences Associated with Formal Sexual Harassment Charges, 38
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 559, 559 (1985)).
9 Pub. L. No. 88-352, July 2, 1964.
10 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993). Although not having the effect of law, these
Guidelines have been utilized by many courts as interpretative authority. See, e.g.,
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (finding that the EEOC Guide-
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harassment is broken down into two categories-quid pro quo and
hostile work environment. 1 '
Hostile work environment sexual harassment was first addressed by American courts in 1981.12 It was not until 1986, however, that the United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 1 3 analyzed this form of harassment.14 The Court held
that to be actionable, the complained of conduct had to be severe
or pervasive enough to alter the plaintiffs employment
conditions
5
and create a hostile or abusive work environment.1
In July of 1993, the New Jersey Supreme Court was called
upon for the first time to define the standards of hostile work environment sexual harassment.1 6 In a unanimous five justice opinion,17 the court held in Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us. Inc. that to state a
valid claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a female plaintiff must first allege that the discriminatory conduct oclines, "'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance'") (quotations omitted). See infra note 59 for a further
discussion of the EEOC Guidelines.
11 See Carillo, supra note 6, at 58. In order to prove a valid claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that there was an unwelcome request or demand for sexual favors, and employment conditions were positively or negatively affected as a result of compliance with or rejection of these requests or demands. See
Steven B. Harz & Leslie A. Lajewski, Sexual HarassmentLaw In The Workplace, ESSEX
CouNTrY BAR FOUNDATION CHRONICLE, Dec. 1993, at 1. Examples of such conduct
deemed quid pro quo sexual harassment include when an employee is discharged for
refusing to submit to a supervisor's sexual advances; when an employee's position is
abolished after refusing to comply with a supervisor's sexual demands; and when an
employee is given uncharacteristically poor evaluations or reprimands because of the
employee's failure to submit to the sexual requests of a supervisor. Id. at 12. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has found that quid pro quo harassment occurs when an
employer conditions a worker's employment on the worker's submission to sexual
demands. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 601, 626 A.2d 445, 452 (1993).
Quid pro quo sexual harassment involves either explicit or implicit threats that if
employees do not consent to a supervisor's demands, they will lose tangible job benefits or suffer adverse employment privileges. Id. Hostile work environment sexual
harassment arises when an employee is harassed to such a degree that the employee's
work environment becomes hostile. Id.
12 Adler & Pierce, supra note 8, at 780 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.D.C. 1981)).
13 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
14 Adler & Pierce, supra note 8, at 781 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986)).
15 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted).
16 Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 602, 626 A.2d 445, 453 (1993).
17 Id. at 627, 626 A.2d at 466. Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, O'Hern,
and Stein joinedJustice Garibaldi in her ruling for the modification, affirmance, and
remand of the appellate division's judgment. Id.
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curred because of her gender. 8 The court further required that a
reasonable woman 9 in the plaintiff's position would deem such
conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her employment
conditions and create an offensive, hostile, or intimidating working
atmosphere.20 In addition, the court posited that an employer
would be held strictly liable for a supervisor's conduct when computing equitable damages and relief"1 Furthermore, the court
held that an employer could also be vicariously liable, under
agency principles, for compensatory damages which exceed equitable damAges and relief.2 2 The court asserted, however, that an employer would not be liable for punitive damages unless the
23
employer ratified, participated or acquiesced in the harassment.
In August of 1981, Theresa Lehmann began her employment
at Toys 'R' Us as a file clerk and during the next few years was
promoted into various supervisory positions.2 4 In late 1985, Toys
'R' Us hired Dan Baylous as Director of Purchasing Administration. 25 Lehmann, among other employees, was under Baylous's direct supervision. 26 Lehmann was given favorable evaluations and
promotions by Baylous and in late 1986 became the Systems Analyst for the Purchasing Department. 27 A few months later, Lehmann began to notice Baylous engaging in what she believed to be
18

Id. at 603, 626 A.2d at 453.

19 Id. Justice Garibaldi reasoned that the standard set forth in Lehmann, where the
plaintiff was a female, would be tailored to female plaintiffs generally, because the
majority of plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases are women. Id. at 604, 626 A.2d at
454. The majority maintained, however, that this standard also applied to harassment
of men by women, women by women, and men by men. Id. In making this determination, the court recognized that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD)
barred homosexual as well as heterosexual harassment. Id. The only difference for a
male plaintiff, the court stressed, would be that the plaintiff would have to allege
conduct that a reasonable man would believe created a hostile working environment
towards men and that such conduct altered his working conditions. Id. See infra note
56 for a detailed discussion of the LAD.
20 Id. at 603-04, 626 A.2d at 453.
21 Id. at 626, 626 A.2d at 465.
22 Id. at 623, 626, 626 A.2d at 464, 465.
23 Id. at 625, 626 A.2d at 464 (citing Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774,
783 (S.D. Ohio 1988)).
24 T.L. v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 616, 620, 605 A.2d 1125, 1127 (App.
Div. 1992). Lehmann was initially hired as a file clerk in the Purchasing Department.
Id. She was promoted several times to positions such as Data Entry Supervisor and
Purchase Order Management Supervisor. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 620-21, 605 A.2d at 1127. Baylous and Lehmann had a close, daily working relationship and met weekly in his office. Id. at 621, 605 A.2d at 1127.
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offensive sexual behavior toward other female employees. 8
Baylous's allegedly harassing conduct was soon directed towards Lehmann. 29 According to Lehmann, Baylous told her on at
least two occasions in early 1987 to expose her breasts to male employees ° and at various other times commented on her anatomy.3 1
Lehmann alleged that another incident occurred while in Baylous's office in January of 1987, whereby Baylous lifted the back of
her shirt exposing her brassiere.32
On January 22, 1987, Lehmann's first complaint about Baylous's conduct was made to Bill Frankfort, Baylous's direct supervisor. 3' Frankfort instructed the plaintiff to handle the problem
herself and not to report the complaint to Howard Moore, the Ex28 Id. Lehmann recorded numerous instances where Baylous touched or grabbed
female employees. Lehmann, 132 NJ. at 595, 626 A.2d at 449. At a Christmas party
Lehmann witnessed Baylous place his hands on a female employee from behind. Id.
Lehmann alleged that the woman found the touching offensive and that the woman
angrily told Baylous to take his hands off of her. Id. On another occasion, Lehmann
and two other female employees were in Baylous's office. T.L., 255 NJ. Super. at 621,
605 A.2d at 1127. One woman had changed into jeans after wearing a dress in the
morning, and the plaintiff testified that "Don put his hands on [the woman's] waist
and asked her if she had gone home for a quickie." Id.
29 See T.L., 255 NJ. Super. at 621, 605 A.2d at 1127.
30 Id. at 621-22, 605 A.2d at 1127-28. Lehmann testified that Baylous instructed
her to have an employee rewrite a 300-page purchase order. Lehmann, 132 NJ. at 595,
626 A.2d at 449. When she mentioned that the employee would be angry, Baylous
told her to "' [jlust lean over his desk and show him your tits ....'" Id. On another
occasion, the plaintiff asserted that she and Baylous were discussing a new potential
boss for the company and she related to him that she was nervous because he was
reputed to have a quick temper. T.L., 255 NJ. Super. at 622, 605 A.2d at 1128. Baylous replied, "'[W]ell, just stick your tits out at him as if you're brave and act as if
you're brave.'" Id.
31 T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 622, 605 A.2d at 1128. For example, on one occasion
Baylous told Lehmann to "'write a memo to cover [your] ass,... because you have
such a cute little ass.'" Id.
32 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 596, 626 A.2d at 449-50. The plaintiff claimed that while in
Baylous's office on this occasion, she was looking out his window at scaffolding. Id. at
598, 626 A.2d at 451. Although Lehmann didn't see anyone, she assumed that window washers were present. T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 622, 605 A.2d at 1128. At that
point, Baylous lifted her shirt over her shoulders and told her to "'give them a show.'"
Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 596, 626 A.2d at 450. In support of the plaintiffs contention,
Marlene Pantess, a fellow employee, testified that Lehmann had come running out of
Baylous's office and had cried to her that he had lifted her shirt. Id. However, according to Jeffrey Wells, the head of personnel at Toys 'R' Us, there had been no window
washing at the building in January of 1987. T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 630, 605 A.2d at
1132. Toys 'R' Us also contacted the company that washed the windows at the office,
and was advised that they had done no work during that time frame. Id. at 628, 605
A.2d at 1131.
33 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 596, 626 A.2d at 450. Lehmann requested anonymity in
her complaint and told Frankfort that she was afraid to confront Baylous directly. Id.
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ecutive Vice President in charge of purchasing.34 On January 26,
1987, Eric Jonas, the Manager of Employee Relations, called Lehmann and another female employee to his office to discuss their
allegations against Baylous. 5 At the meeting, Lehmann was told
that management would confront Baylous,36 and a few days later,
37
Frankfort informed Lehmann that management had done so.
Despite Frankfort's assurances, Lehmann claimed that Baylous's behavior did not improve.38 In early February of 1987, Baylous allegedly threatened to "take advantage" of the plaintiff.3 9
Lehmann contacted Jonas about this threat and was told to begin
memorializing such harassing incidents.4" In the following weeks,
Lehmann noted several more incidents involving comments and
touchings by Baylous.4 1 In early March, Lehmann once again informed both Frankfort and Jonas that Baylous's harassing conduct
had not ceased.4 2 Lehmann testified that Jonas first responded by
questioning her rationality and then offered to transfer her away
from Baylous, a suggestion which Lehmann promptly rejected.4 3
34 Id. Frankfort explained that the Vice President was a "'straight-laced'" family
man, and did not want Lehmann to inform him. Id. On January 26, 1987, Lehmann
delivered a letter to Frankfort detailing her complaint of sexual harassment, but it was
not opened until after her resignation in April of 1987. T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 623,
605 A.2d at 1128.
35 T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 623, 605 A.2d at 1128. During this encounter, both
Lehmann and her co-worker told Jonas of specific harassing incidents involving Baylous. Id. They presented to Jonas six or seven names of fellow employees who had
complained about Baylous's behavior. Id. Lehmann also told Jonas that she wanted
Baylous's conduct stopped, but did not want him to be fired. Id.
36 Id. Jonas told Lehmann that because she requested anonymity, the situation
would be harder to handle, but assured her that "'he could handle it by saying that
someone had complained, and that should be enough to make him stop.'" Id.
37 Id. Lehmann testified that she felt a sense of relief and figured that the problem would end. Id., 605 A.2d at 1128-29.
38 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 597, 626 A.2d at 450.
39 Id. During this incident, Lehmann informed Baylous that she felt ill while in his
office, and that if she fainted, to "just kick me into the hall.'" Id. Baylous responded
that if this occurred, he would " ' take advantage of [her].'" Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. Lehmann's sister, another co-worker, experienced an incident where Baylous had approached her from behind and rubbed her shoulders. Id. The plaintiff
also observed Baylous remarking on another female employee's anatomy. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. Lehmann responded that she loved her job, had done nothing wrong, and
that she was not the person that should be transferred. Id. She also told Jonas that
her father and husband were upset and wanted her to resign. T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at
624, 605 A.2d at 1129. Jonas advised her not to resign because she hal not received
her bonus check. Id. Soon thereafter, Lehmann again became offended by Baylous's
conduct during a meeting at which they were both in attendance. Lehmann, 132 N.J.
at 597, 626 A.2d at 450. At this meeting, Baylous offered to those inattendance that
he and a female employee were not both ill as a result of " ' sexual intimacy.'" Id.
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Finally, dissatisfied with the efforts of Jonas and Frankfort, Lehmann brought her complaints to the Executive Vice President in
charge of purchasing on April 6, 1987. 44 Later that day, Lehmann
was called to meet with Laurie Lambert in the personnel department.4 5 Lambert reiterated the offer to transfer Lehmann, and
Lehmann again refused.4 6
The following day, citing personal reasons, Lehmann gave
Baylous a two-week notice of her resignation. 47 Later that afternoon, Lehmann was again called to Lambert's office.48 Lambert
offered Lehmann a transfer for the third time and also recommended that Lehmann approach Baylous directly with her allegations.4 9 Lehmann refused both suggestions.5" Moments later,
Baylous entered the room and Lehmann finally confronted him.5
Lehmann testified that Baylous was initially apologetic,5 2 but soon
thereafter denied her accusations and became very angry.5" Lehmann left Toys 'R' Us after this confrontation, claiming that she
could never return to work there.5 4
Lehmann filed a civil action in the New Jersey Superior Court,
Law Division, against Toys 'R' Us, Don Baylous, and Jeffrey Wells, a
human resources manager. 55 The complaint alleged that Lehmann had been subjected to hostile work environment sexual har44 Id. Lehmann complained that she was being forced to leave the company, and
Moore was upset that he had not been apprised of the situation. Id.
45 Id. At this meeting, Lehmann informed Lambert of all of her complaints
against Baylous. Id.
46 Id. at 597-98, 626 A.2d at 450. Lehmann again voiced her protest against being
transferred, asking, "'[W] hy should I have to transfer when I worked so hard for this
job that I love after six years of being in this company?'" Id. at 598, 626 A.2d at 450.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id., 626 A.2d at 451.
51 Id. Lehmann testified that she felt trapped and upset by the situation, but nevertheless told Baylous everything about which she had been complaining. TL., 255
N.J. Super. at 626, 605 A.2d at 1130.
52 Id. Lehmann recalled that Baylous "'apologized in the beginning. Then he
started to deny things, but I do remember him saying that he would try to keep his
hands in his pockets.'" Id.
53 Id. Baylous denied the sweater lifting incident that had allegedly occurred in
his office. Id. Lehmann asserted that Baylous then became increasingly angry and
she became "hysterical." Id. Baylous also testified that he "'admitted being a very
touchy person'" but only in a social, nonsexual manner. Id. at 627, 605 A.2d at 1130.
54 Id. at 626, 605 A.2d at 1130. Lehmann maintained "'that they took a hostile
work environment and made it even worse,'" and claimed she could not return to
work at Toys 'R' Us because of the forced confrontation to which she was subjected.
Id.
55 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 593, 626 A.2d at 448.
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assment in violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination
(LAD) .56 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs hostile work envi56 Id. Lehmann's complaint alleged that this harassment had caused her pain and
suffering, anxiety, humiliation, health problems, medical expenditures, lost wages
and pension benefits, and financial losses due to attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Id. In addition, Lehmann alleged claims separate from the LAD action including battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
intentional interference with contractual relations. Id.
In support of her harassment claim, Lehmann's attorney sent her to a psychologist in 1989 for evaluation. T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 626, 605 A.2d at 1130. She was
diagnosed as having a "simple phobia" attributable to sexual harassment in the workplace. Id. at 626-27, 605 A.2d at 1130. The psychologist testified that:
"It may not be that it was herself that was being touched and violated at
that point, but after she experienced the personal invasion, after she
was either touched or remarks were made against her, hearing about
those remarks, hearing that they are continuing, seeing other people
being touched, hearing about other people being touched, certainly
contributes to the continued feeling of being uncomfortable in that
atmosphere."
Id. at 627, 605 A.2d at 1130.
Lehmann brought her claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,
and the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the main purpose of the LAD,
enacted in 1945, is "'nothing less than the eradication 'of the cancer of discrimination."" Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600, 626 A.2d at 451-52 (quoting Fuchilla v. Layman, 109
N.J. 319, 334, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (1988) (quotingJackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113,
124, 253 A.2d 793, 799 (1969))). The NewJersey Supreme Court had previously recognized that the LAD sought to ensure a workplace which is free from discrimination.
Fuchilla, 109 N.J. at 334, 537 A.2d at 660. The Lehmann court continued this reasoning by further condemning gender-based discrimination, which the court labeled as
"'peculiarly repugnant in a society which prides itself on judging each individual by
his or her merits.'" Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600, 626 A.2d at 452 (quoting Grigoletti v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 96, 570 A.2d 903, 906 (1990) (citation
omitted)).
The LAD explicitly bans sex-based employment discrimination:
It shall be unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an
unlawful discrimination:
a. For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, [or]

sex . . .of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to
discharge . . . from employment such individual or to discriminate

against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 1993).
Because the LAD's legislative history failed to mention sexual harassment, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has often looked to Title VII federal precedent for guidance in this area. Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600, 626 A.2d at 452. In analyzing unlawful
discrimination claims brought under the LAD, the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted the United States Supreme Court's approach to interpreting discrimination
claims under Title VII. G'igoletti, 118 N.J. at 97, 570 A.2d at 907. The Supreme Court
has employed the McDonnell Douglas test, and the NewJersey judiciary has utilized this
approach as a starting point for actions brought under the LAD. Id. at 97-98, 570
A.2d at 907 (quotation omitted); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the analysis of the McDonnell
Douglas approach:
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ronment sexual harassment claim.57
The appellate division unanimously' reversed the dismissal of
the sexual harassment claim and remanded the case to the trial
court for further analysis.5 8 Despite agreeing that the trial court
The McDonnell Douglas approach established the elements of a primafacie case of unlawful discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class, (2) applied and was qualified for a position for which the
employer was seeking applicants, (3) was rejected despite adequate
qualifications, and (4) after rejection the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applications for persons of plaintiff's
qualifications. Establishment of the primafacie case gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the applicant. The burden of going forward then shifts to the employer to rebut
the presumption of undue discrimination by articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. The
plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason articulated by
the defendant was not the true reason for the employment decision but
was merely a pretext for discrimination. In such cases the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff;
only the burden of going forward shifts.
Grfigoletti, 118 N.J. at 98, 570 A.2d at 907 (quoting Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483,
492-93, 446 A.2d 486, 490-91 (1982)).
57 Lehmann, 132 NJ. at 593, 626 A.2d at 448. Following a six day bench trial, all of
the plaintiff's causes of action, except for the battery claim against Baylous, were dismissed. Id. The trial court awarded Lehmann $5000 in punitive damages, finding
that Baylous's single, nonconsensual touching of her constituted a battery. T.L., 255
N.J. Super. at 616, 605 A.2d at 1125.
58 Lehmann, 132 NJ. at 593, 626 A.2d at 448. The appellate division ruled that the
lower court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the sexual harassment
claim, and remanded the case for further factual analysis. Id. The law division judge
set forth the following law and reasoning which was rejected by the appellate division:
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not proffered enough evidence to show
that defendant, Baylous, acted intentionally to harass plaintiff because
she was a woman. Additionally, plaintiff has not proven that the discrimination was pervasive and regular. The complained of conduct creates a hostile work environment when it is repeated to the point where
it is routine and becomes a condition of employment.
Assuming that all incidents plaintiff and plaintiffs witnesses testified to occurred, Baylous' actions, although annoying, were not sufficiently outrageous to sustain plaintiff's allegations. A review of the
record indicates that Baylous touched plaintiff and other employees in
an asexual manner on a number of occasions. This type of touching
does not amount to sexual harassment or discrimination. Baylous made
several rude and off color comments to plaintiff and other employees.
Off color remarks are insufficient to create a sexually hostile work environment. Also the evidence does not indicate that Baylous' vulgarity
affected the totality of the work environment. On the contrary, several
witnesses testified that Baylous' actions did not offend them. Baylous'
behavior with regard to the sweater-lifting incident was improper and
child-like. However, the sweater-lifting incident combined with rude
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had applied the wrong legal standards in analyzing the LAD claim,
the appellate division split three ways in determining both the appropriate standards to be applied to the hostile work environment
claim and the extent of Toys 'R' Us's liability for its supervisor's
actions. 59 Both Lehmann and Toys 'R' Us, Inc. appealed the apcomments and occasional asexual touchings does not amount to a sexually hostile environment.
An important factor in this Court's determination is the amount of
time over which the alleged acts of harassment occurred .... Thus, this
Court finds that the conduct plaintiff complained of did not occur regularly over a sufficiently lengthy period of time to become a "condition"
of plaintiff's employment.
T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 631-32, 605 A.2d at 1133 (citations omitted). The judge also
posited that although Baylous's conduct affected Lehmann adversely, a reasonable
person in Lehmann's position would not have been affected. Id. at 632, 605 A.2d at
1133.
59 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 593-94, 626 A.2d at 448. First, Judge Shebell stated that "'a
more structured test is required at this juncture.'" T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 642, 605
A.2d at 1139 (citation omitted). Judge Shebell adopted, with certain modifications,
the first four prongs of the five-part test utilized in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia. Id. at
635-38, 605 A.2d at 1135-37 (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1482 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Andrews test required that: "(1) the employees suffered
intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive
and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that
position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability." Andrews, 895 F.2d at
1482. Judge Shebell rejected the respondeat superior principles used by the Andrews
court and instead held that an employer was strictly liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment by a supervisor. TL., 255 N.J. Super. at 638-40, 605 A.2d at
1137-38.
In a concurring opinion, Judge D'Annunzio agreed with the majority view in
general, but did not subscribe to the court's adoption of strict liability principles.
T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 644, 605 A.2d at 1140 (D'Annunzio, J.A.D., concurring). Instead, the judge posited that liability should be based on respondeat superior principles and, alternatively, on the inadequate response of an employer who has
knowledge that an employee is creating a hostile work environment. Id.
(D'Annunzio, J.A.D., concurring).
Finally, Judge Skillman, concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected the
majority's use of the Andrews test and urged the use of the EEOC's Guidelines. Id. at
648, 605 A.2d at 1142 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11) (Skillman, J.A.D., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). These Guidelines state in pertinent part:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when .

.

. (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably

interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (3). The Guidelines further provide that:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of
the circumstances .... The determination of the legality of a particular
action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b). After discussing these Guidelines, Judge Skillman concluded
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pellate division's ruling to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which
granted certification 60 to identify these applicable standards.6 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lehmann was
founded upon a combination of United States Supreme Court rulings and other federal precedent, 62 as well as a re-evaluation of existing New Jersey case law. 6' Rogers v. EEOC,64 a 1971 Fifth Circuit
landmark decision, was the first case to recognize that a discriminatory work environment could establish a valid cause of action.6 5
Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a
Hispanic plaintiff could maintain a Title VII cause of action 66 by
showing that her employer, by discriminating against its Hispanic
clientele, created an offensive work environment.6 7 By so ruling,
that agency principles should govern an employer's vicarious liability for supervisory
sexual harassment of an employee. T.L., 255 N.J. Super. at 660, 605 A.2d at 1149
(Skillman, J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 594, 626 A.2d at 449.
61 Id.
62 Rocco Cammarere, Court Defines Sexual Harassment Test, N.J. LAWYER, July 19,
1993, at 1. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that
hostile work environment sexual harassment was a violation of Title VII); Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (defining the standards of a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII); Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that a discriminatory work environment can be the basis of a Title VII action).
63 See, e.g., Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 569 A.2d 793 (1990)
(holding that sexual harassment claims based on submission or coercion are prohibited by the LAD); Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 605 A.2d 242
(App. Div. 1992) (interpreting the LAD as prohibiting hostile and pervasive nonsexual harassment).
64 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
65 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238). The plaintiff in Rogers,
Josephine Chavez, was employed by Texas State Optical, and on April 11, 1969, filed a
complaint with the EEOC alleging employment discrimination against her employers.
Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Tex. 1970). Mrs. Chavez, who worked
with seven caucasian females, was the only employee with a Spanish surname. Id. at
423. The complaint alleged that Mrs. Chavez was abused by her co-workers because
of her nationality, and was terminated without reason. Id. Mrs. Chavez also added
that her employer told her he had to dismiss her because of "friction." Id. Finally, the
complainant alleged that Texas State Optical provided different treatment to its patients according to their nationality. Id. at 425. As to this latter complaint, the district
court asserted that Mrs. Chavez lacked standing to assert the claim. Id.
66 See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that it is
'an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, condition-s, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 88352, § 703 (a) (1), July 2, 1964). The Rogers court held the position that it was Congress's intent to broadly define employment discrimination in this statute in order to
allow for the constant changes that surround this complex area of law. Id.
67 Id. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the petitioner's claim that her employ-
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the court expanded an employee's Title VII safeguards beyond
economic areas of employment, creating a new psychological zone
of protection from employers who discriminate against minority
group employees.6 8
Following Rogers, the United States Supreme Court recognized
for the first time, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,6 9 a Title VII
claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.70 In so ruling, the Menitor Court looked to the 1980 EEOC Guidelines which
supported the proposition that harassment causing non-economic
injury violated Title VII. 7 1 Accepting the EEOC's proposition that
sexual harassment was prohibited by Title VII as a form of sex discrimination, the Meritor Court ruled that a work environment,
deemed hostile because of discriminatory sexual harassment, was
also protected under the statute.7 2
ers "'segregated the patients'" should be interpreted to charge that they discriminated among their patients on the basis of each individual's national origin. Id. at
237.
68 See id. at 238. Circuit Judge Goldberg, author of the Rogers opinion, addressed
this new zone of protection in terms of Title VII's ban on ethnic and racial discrimination, writing:
Therefore, it is my belief that employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer
abuse, and that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination .... One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the
eradication of such noxious practices.
Id.
In dissent, Circuit Judge Roney stressed the belief that the plaintiff's charge was
not included within the scope of Congress's Title VII unlawful employment practice
provisions. Id. at 246 (Roney, J., dissenting). Judge Roney further disputed the majority's contention that an employee's psychological well-being should be afforded
discriminatory protection under Title VII, reasoning that there was:
no indication in the Act or the legislative history that Congress in passing Title VII was concerned about whether an employer's business
presents conditions for employment that are environmentally attractive
to all, whether the manner of his operation suits everyone, or whether a
particular individual might be uncomfortable or have feelings of unhappiness in his employment.
Id.
69 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70 Id. at 66.
71 Id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). The Court found the EEOC
Guidelines supportive of the proposition that regardless of economic injury, sexual
harassment in the workplace could be a Title VII infraction. Id.
72 Id. at 65-66. The United States Supreme Court cited favorably to the ruling
established by the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. Dundee. Id. at 66-67 (citing Henson v.
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In Meitor,the Court addressed questions concerning a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim brought under Title
VII, and employer liability for the conduct of its supervisors."m
Mechelle Vinson, a female bank employee, alleged that her supervisor subjected her to repeated sexual demands over a three-year
period.14 Then-Justice Rehnquist, although recognizing a valid
sexual harassment claim, noted that not all harassing conduct
would affect a "term, condition, or privilege of employment within
the realm of Title VII protection."7 5 The Justice opined that the
objectionable conduct had to be adequately "severe or pervasive"
employment and create a
to change the conditions of a plaintiff's
76
hostile or abusive work environment.
The Court also rejected the bank's contentions that Congress,
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)). The Henson court squarely addressed
the hostile work environment sexual harassment issue, and the Meritor Court quoted
the following passage from the Eleventh Circuit opinion:
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets."
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902); accord Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55
(4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that unwelcome and demeaning sexual behavior directed towards the plaintiff created a hostile working environment); Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (ruling that a plaintiff must
show that the harassment unreasonably hindered the plaintiffs work performance or
created a hostile, offensive, or intimidating working environment).
73 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-68, 69-73.
74 Id. at 60. Sidney Taylor hired Vinson as a teller-trainee at the bank. Id. at 59.
According to Vinson, shortly after her probationary period, Taylor took her out to
dinner and suggested a sexual encounter. Id. at 60. After initially refusing, Vinson
testified that she agreed to this proposition, claiming that she acquiesced out of fear
of losing her employment. Id. Vinson, although acknowledging between 40 to 50
sexual encounters with Taylor, claimed that Taylor fondled her, exposed himself, and
forcibly raped her on various occasions. Id. Despite these charges, the respondent
never filed a complaint with the bank or reported the harassing conduct to any of
Taylor's supervisors. Id. at 61. Four years after starting work at the bank, Vinson left
Meritor Savings Bank on sick leave, and the bank, characterizing her leave as excessive, discharged her. Id. at 60. Vinson subsequently brought this action, seeking injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and punitive and compensatory damages against the
bank and Taylor. Id.
75 Id. at 67.
76 Id. (quotation omitted). The Court, citing the EEOC Guidelines, recognized
that the main element of all sexual harassment charges was whether the sexual conduct was "unwelcome" by the plaintiff. Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a)
(1985)). Additionally, the Court found relevant the petitioner's sexually provocative
dress and speech in determining whether the respondent's sexual advances were truly
unwelcome, and determined that charges of sexual harassment must be viewed by
looking at the record as a whole. Id. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
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in implementing Title VII, was concerned only with tangible, economic losses.7 7 In addressing the bank's liability for the conduct
of its supervisors, the Court failed to issue a concrete ruling, but
agreed with the EEOC's proposition that it was Congress's intention to have the courts use agency principles for guidance.78
In 1990, the Third Circuit was confronted with the issue of
hostile work environment sexual harassment in Andrews v. City of
79
Philadelphia.
In Andrews, two female police officers brought a
hostile work environment suit against their direct supervisors, as
well as the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, and the City of Philadelphia. 80 In its ruling, the Third Circuit clearly enumerated the
requisite elements necessary to bring such a claim under Title
VII. 8 1 First, the court ruled that the employees had to establish
that they were the victims of intentional discrimination because of
their sex.8" Second, the majority noted that the discriminatory
77 Meritor,477 U.S. at 64. Instead, the Court posited that Congress intended "'to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women'" in employment. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707, n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971))).
78 Id. at 72. The Court concluded that the court of appeals made an error by
imposing absolute liability upon employers for their supervisor's sexually harassing
conduct, regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of the behavior. Id. at 63, 72. The Court also rejected the bank's contention that Vinson's
failure to invoke the bank's grievance procedure shielded it from liability. Id. at 72.
In so ruling, Justice Rehnquist declared that the existence of a formal grievance procedure and an employer policy prohibiting discrimination, coupled with an employee's failure to use such a device, would not necessarily insulate an employer from
liability. Id.
79 895 F.2d 1469, 1471 (3d Cir. 1990).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1482. Accord Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 298-99,
605 A.2d 242, 247-48 (App. Div. 1992) (adopting the five elements set forth in Andrews
in evaluating a claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination). See infra
notes 91-95 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of Muench.
Priscilla Kelsey Andrews and Debra Ann Conn were female members of the Philadelphia Police Department's Accident Investigation Department. Andrews, 895 F.2d at
1471. Both officers claimed that they were harassed by co-workers and supervisors
because of their sex. Id. The conduct included destruction of property, destruction
of work product, subjection to abusive and obscene language, harassing telephone
calls, and Andrews being severely burned by a lime substance that was placed in her
shirt. Id. at 1471, 1474.
The Andrews court held that to institute an action for sexual harassment on the
grounds of an offensive and intimidating work environment, a plaintiff had to prove
"'by the totality of the circumstances, the existence of a hostile or abusive working
environment which is severe enough to affect the psychological stability of a minority
employee.'" Id. at 1482 (quoting Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 863 F.2d
1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)).
82 Id. The court stated that in sex discrimination cases involving implicit sexual
language, propositions, innuendo, or pornographic material, the intent to discrimi-
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conduct had to have been pervasive and regular."3 Third, the
court determined that the discrimination had to have detrimentally affected the plaintiffs.8 4 Fourth, the majority held that a reasonable person of the same sex in the employee's position would
also be detrimentally affected by the conduct.8 5 Finally, the Andrews court mandated that fact finders should utilize respondeat
superior principles in determining an employer's liability for the
actions of its supervisors.8 6
Armed with these federal precedents, the NewJersey Supreme
Court, in Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co.,87 determined whether
a plaintiff had established a valid reverse sex discrimination claim
under the NewJersey Law Against Discrimination.8 8 The court, explaining that the LAD served to promote equal employment opportunities, held that sexual harassment based on submission or
nate would, as a matter of course, be recognized, and where the conduct was not
sexual in nature, as in the Andrews case, a more detailed analysis of the facts would be
required for a showing of sex-based discrimination. Id. at 1482, n.3.
83 Id. at 1482. According to the court, pervasive harassment occurs when "'incidents of harassment occur either in concert or with regularity.'" Id. at 1484 (quoting
Lopez v. S.B. Thomas Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir. 1987)). ContraLehmann v.
Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 606, 626 A.2d 445, 455 (1993) (rejecting the "pervasive
and regular" element and adopting a "severe or pervasive" standard).
84 Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482.
85 Id. The third and fourth elements set forth in Andrews presented both a subjective and objective standard, respectively. Id. at 1483. The court dictated that the subjective standard set forth in element three would ensure that the specific plaintiff had
been aggrieved, while the objective standard, embodied in prong four, would protect
employers against hypersensitive employees. Id.
In adopting this objective, reasonable woman standard, the Third Circuit recognized that conduct that men might find innocent and harmless could be construed
differently by women. Id. at 1486 (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1449, 1451 (1984)).
86 Id. at 1482. In evaluating employer liability, the court adhered to the use of
agency principles. Id. at 1486 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986)). Thus, the court held that if it could be proven that management had either
actual or constructive knowledge of a sexually hostile work environment, and adequate and prompt remedial action was not taken, the employer would be held liable.
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486. Quoting the Sixth Circuit, which had addressed such employer action two years earlier, the Andrews court noted:
[W]hile Title VII does not require that an employer fire all "Archie
Bunkers" in its employ, the law does require that an employer take
prompt action to prevent such bigots from expressing their opinion in a
way that abuses or offends co-workers. By informing people that the
expression of racist or sexist attitudes in public is unacceptable, people
may eventually learn that such views are undesirable in private, as well.
Thus, Title VII may advance the goal of eliminating prejudices and biases in our society.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988)).
87 117 N.J. 539, 569 A.2d 793 (1990).
88 Id. at 544, 569 A.2d at 795.
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coercion was prohibited by the LAD. 89 Although not specifically
addressing whether nonsexual conduct could establish a valid hostile work environment claim under the LAD, the court concluded
that the LAD's ban on sex discrimination included "coercive" harassment which resulted in a hostile environment. 90
Following the decision set forth in Erickson, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, in Muench v. Township of Haddon,9 ' addressed whether the plaintiff's hostile work environment
claim against her supervisor gave rise to a LAD action for sexual
discrimination where there was no proof of coercive sexual harassment.9 2 In Muench, a female police dispatcher, Helen Muench, was
continuously harassed in a non-coercive manner by her male supervisor.9" The court, relying extensively on federal precedent,9 4
89 Id. at 556, 569 A.2d at 801. Erickson made specific allegations of a "paramour
claim." Id. at 549, 569 A.2d at 798. This claim stated that Erickson was accused of a
frivolous sexual harassment claim so that his male supervisor, Frank Hayes, could promote Hayes's female romantic companion. Id. The court also addressed the issue of
reverse discrimination, mandating that such cases required the plaintiff to make an
initial showing to support the inference that the defendant discriminates against the
majority. Id. at 551, 569 A.2d at 799 (citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 227
NJ. Super. 78, 87, 545 A.2d 812, 816 (App. Div. 1988) (citation omitted)). The court
also invalidated Erickson's claim that he was fired because he was a male. Id. at 559,
569 A.2d at 803. The majority ruled that if Hayes had wished to promote his paramour, it would not have made a difference to him whether Erickson was male or
female. Id.
90 Id. at 555-56, 569 A.2d at 801. The Division of Civil Rights argued that both
sexual harassment that has the effect of creating a hostile work environment, and
sexual harassment which demands that submission to sexual advances is a condition
of employment, are violative of the LAD's ban against sex discrimination. Id.
91 255 N.J. Super. 288, 605 A.2d 242 (App. Div. 1992).
92 Id. at 295, 605 A.2d at 246. The Muench court recognized that the New Jersey
Supreme Court had previously held in Erickson that coercive sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment was banned by the LAD. Id. (citing Erickson, 117 N.J.
at 556, 569 A.2d at 801). The court noted, however, that the Erickson court was not
asked to decide whether nonsexual behavior could give rise to a valid claim of hostile
work environment sexual harassment under the LAD. Id.
93 Id. at 293-94, 605 A.2d at 245. According to Muench, Officer Tortoreto, the
plaintiff's supervisor, believed that the dispatcher position was a 'Job for a male." Id.
at 293, 605 A.2d at 245. When the plaintiff was hired, Officer Tortoreto allegedly
refused to answer her questions regarding office procedures, and often commented
that she was " ' doing a lousy job.'" Id. Additionally, Muench charged that Tortoreto
used profanity in Muench's presence and made comments of a sexual nature which
offended, but which were not sexual advances towards, the plaintiff. Id. at 294, 605
A.2d at 245. For example, on one occasion Tortoreto allegedly boasted to Muench
that he had slept with two women the previous night, and at another time made a
reference to his genitalia. Id.
94 Id. at 295-97, 605 A.2d at 246-47 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (holding that hostile work environment sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII as sex discrimination, and noting that federal
guidelines banned such conduct if it intentionally interfered with an employee's work
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held that interpreting the LAD as forbidding hostile and pervasive
nonsexual harassment would best achieve the LAD's goal of eliminating workplace discrimination.
Against this background of federal and state precedent, the
NewJersey Supreme Court, in Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,96 identified two issues to be answered on appeal.9 7 First, the court addressed the applicable standards to be employed in a claim for
hostile work environment sexual harassment brought under the
LAD.9" Second, the court analyzed the extent of an employer's liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor who creates a hostile
work environment. 99
Before addressing these main concerns, Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, identified several general issues arising out of
sexual harassment jurisprudence in New Jersey.'
Initially, the
court noted that the LAD was enacted in 1945 to erase all forms of
discrimination, which included providing a discrimination-free
work environment to the public. 10 ' The court recognized that
although the statute's legislative history was silent on the area of
sexual harassment, the LAD specifically prohibited sex discrimination in employment practices. 10 2 When confronted with a claim
brought under the LAD, the majority noted, the court had often
analyzed federal precedent governing Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as an integral source of interpretive authority.0' The
performance or gave rise to an offensive, hostile, or intimidating work environment);
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ruling that workplace sexual
harassment need not exhibit sexual overtones or advances to be protected by Title
VII, and holding that "any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or
a group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII").
95 Muench, 255 NJ. Super. at 298, 605 A.2d at 247.
96 132 NJ. 587, 626 A.2d 445 (1993).
97 Id. at 592, 600-15, 626 A.2d at 448, 451-59.
98 Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5"2 (West 1993), and supra note 56 for a
discussion of the LAD.
99 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 592, 615-27, 626 A.2d at 448, 459-66.
100 Id. at 600-03, 626 A.2d at 451-53.
101 Id. at 600, 626 A.2d at 452 (citing Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537
A.2d 652, 660 (quotation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. University of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J. v. Fuchilla, 488 U.S. 826 (1988)) (stating that the purpose of the LAD is
"'nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination.'"). See supra note
56 for an analysis of the LAD.
102 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600, 626 A.2d at 452 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
1993)) (quotation omitted).
103 Id. (citation omitted). Justice Garibaldi, although recognizing that the court
has been influenced by federal precedent in developing LAD standards, noted that
Title VII principles had been applied with flexibility and the court had departed from
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court concluded that sexual harassment violated both the LAD and
10 4
Title VII as a form of sex discrimination.
Justice Garibaldi next explained that sexual harassment jurisprudence was split into two separate arenas-quid pro quo"5 and
hostile work environment-and identified the case at bar as belonging to the latter category.10 6 The court noted that because
hostile work environment sexual harassment was such a recently
recognized cause of action under the LAD, much confusion
among both labor and management existed as to what type of conduct constituted a valid cause of action.10' 7 The New Jersey
Supreme Court, the majority observed, had never been confronted
with defining the elements of a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim before the case subjudice. °8 Therefore, the Lehmann court announced a new, structured test that the justices
federal guidelines "'if a rigid application of its standards is inappropriate under the
circumstances.'" Id. at 600-01, 626 A.2d at 452 (quoting Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 107, 570 A.2d 903, 912 (1990)).
104 Id. at 601, 626 A.2d at 452 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (holding that a Title VII violation would occur "when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex"); Muench
v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 298, 605 A.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1992)
(holding that even nonsexual harassment resulting in a hostile work environment
violated the LAD). See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Meitor and supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for an analysis of Muench.
105 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 601, 626 A.2d at 452. The prohibition of quid pro quo
sexual harassment was illustrated in the EEOC Guidelines:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1993); see, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 984
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the elimination of a female employee's position in retaliation for her refusal to submit to supervisor's sexual demands constituted illegal sex
discrimination). The Lehmann court specified several possible adverse employment
conditions resulting from an employee's refusal to comply with a supervisor's sexual
demands-loss of employment, unfavorable performance evaluations, and failure to
be promoted. Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 601, 626 A.2d at 452. See supra note 11 for a
discussion of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
106 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 601, 626 A.2d at 452. In contrast to quid pro quo harassment, the EEOC Guidelines define hostile work environment sexual harassment as
occurring if "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1993).
107 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 602, 626 A.2d at 452.
108 Id., 626 A.2d at 453; cf Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 55557, 569 A.2d 793, 801-02 (recognizing that sexually hostile work environment allegations can be the basis of a claim under the LAD, but not defining the elements of
such an action).
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hoped would be enforceable as well as comprehensible to both em10 9
ployers and employees.
In announcing the test, the Lehmann majority set forth and
analyzed the four requisite elements to maintain a valid cause of
action for hostile work environment sexual harassment. 1 In order for conduct to be actionable, the court maintained, a plaintiff
would have to demonstrate that the alleged conduct (1) would not
have taken place but for the gender of the employee and (2) was so
"severe or pervasive" that it would make a (3) reasonable woman 1 '
believe that (4) her working conditions had been altered, creating
112
an abusive or hostile work environment.
The court first analyzed the initial element, requiring an employee to show that the harassment she encountered occurred because of her sex. 113 In satisfying this requirement, the majority
explicated, it is critical for a plaintiff to prove that the complained
of conduct would not have occurred had the plaintiff been a mem109 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-04, 626 A.2d at 453. The court stressed the importance
of enacting a standard that would apprise employees of their rights, protect employees from the harms of a hostile working environment, and allow employers to modify
their conduct and policy guidelines in accordance with the law. Id. at 603, 626 A.2d at
453.
110 Id. at 603-04, 626 A.2d at 453. Justice Garibaldi, in setting forth the new standard, agreed with the lower court majority that a structured definition of hostile work
environment sexual harassment needed to be established. Id. at 603, 626 A.2d at 453.
The majority was also cognizant of Appellate Judge Skillman's dissent, which expressed the need for a flexible standard that would allow for the evolution of this new
area of law. Id. The court found that the EEOC Guidelines were not adequately
structured to define the elements of this action. Id. Finally, the court rejected, as did
the dissent below, the Andrews standard set forth by the Third Circuit, finding it to be
analytically deficient. Id. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Andrews decision.
111 Justice Garibaldi proffered that a reasonable woman standard would be used in
the instant case, because in both the case at bar and the majority of sexual harassment
actions, the plaintiff is female. Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 604, 626 A.2d at 454. The court
noted, however, that the standard would apply to all forms of sexual harassment, both
heterosexual and homosexual. Id. The court asserted that in reverse discrimination
cases involving a male plaintiff, the plaintiff would be required "to allege conduct that
a reasonable man would believe altered the conditions of his employment and created a working environment that was hostile to men." Id. In order to invoke this
presumption, the justice observed, the male plaintiff would be required to make the
additional showing that the defendant was among the uncommon group of employers that discriminates against the traditionally privileged male population. Id. at 60506, 626 A.2d at 454-55 (citing Erickson, 117 N.J. at 551, 569 A.2d at 799).
112 Id. at 603-04, 626 A.2d at 453. The court noted that the first prong of the test
was separable from the latter three elements, which required an interdependent analysis. Id. at 604, 626 A.2d at 453.
113 Id. at 604-06, 626 A.2d at 454-55. The majority noted that this initial element
had to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 604, 626 A.2d at 454.
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ber of the opposite sex.' 14 The court dictated, however, that a
plaintiff would not be required to show that the employer had intentionally discriminated against her.1 15 Justice Garibaldi next
promulgated that in situations where the alleged conduct was sexual in nature, such as sexual touchings or comments, this first element would be satisfied. 1 6 The court further acknowledged that
the harassing conduct need not be overtly sexual for a successful
claim, but in those non-sex based situations, the plaintiff must
make a prima facie showing that, but for her sex, the conduct
1 17
would not have occurred.
The majority next explained the second prong of the court's
new test, requiring that the alleged conduct be "severe or pervasive.''11 Justice Garibaldi emphasized that the harassing conduct
itself, and not its effects on the work environment or the plaintiff,
should be measured against this severe or pervasive standard. 19
Adopting this element, the court reasoned, would align New Jersey
law with United States Supreme Court precedent in Title VII law,
which employs identical "severe or pervasive" language. 120 At the
same time, the court rejected the Third Circuit's "regular and pervasive" standard, which was set forth in Andrews and adopted by the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. 121 The court reasoned that the Andrews standard was not only inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent,1 2 2 but would also serve to bar claims
based on a single, severe incident, or those founded on multiple
114 Id. The court cautioned that no LAD violation exists when a supervisor's behavior is equally offensive to all workers and not directed towards members of a particular sex. Id.
115 Id. Recognizing that the LAD served to eliminate both intentional and unintentional discrimination, the majority omitted intent as an element of a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim. Id. at 604-05, 626 A.2d at 454.
116 Id. at 605, 626 A.2d at 454.
117 Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super.
288, 292, 605 A.2d 242, 244 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that hostile and pervasive nonsexual harassment of a female police dispatcher, which occurred because of her sex,
violated the LAD); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1471, 1485 (3d Cir.
1990) (finding that sexual harassment existed when female police officers, because of
their sex, were subjected to, among other things, theft and vandalism of their personal property by co-workers on the force).
118 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 606-07, 626 A.2d at 455.
119 Id. at 606, 626 A.2d at 455 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.
1991)).
120 Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
121 Id. (citations omitted); see T.L. v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 616, 636, 605
A.2d 1125, 1136 (1992) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482).
122 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 606, 626 A.2d at 455. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (holding
that for sexual harassment to be actionable, the conduct must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to cause the requisite harm).
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but random acts of harassment.1 23
After reasoning that the objectionable conduct had to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to state an actionable claim under the
LAD, Justice Garibaldi announced the requisite level of harm necessary to bring such an action.1 24 In reaching the standard, the
majority considered the fourth prong of the new test and, in so
doing, addressed a disagreement that had divided the federal circuit courts for several years. 12 5 The court, by adopting the view
held by the First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits,
held that the plaintiff had to prove that the harassing conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the victim's employment
conditions, thus creating an abusive working environment. 12 6 In so
ruling, the majority rejected the position held by the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits that the plaintiff had to show
that the victim's psychological well-being was seriously affected by
the harassing conduct. 127 The majority reasoned that although the
123 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 606, 626 A.2d at 455. The court espoused that although it
would be rare that a single incident of harassment would be severe enough to state a
valid claim, this remote possibility should not be precluded. Id. at 606-07, 626 A.2d at
455. Further, the court reasoned that the LAD was enacted to prevent any harm
arising from hostile work environments, and its remedies should not be afforded
solely to cases where there are multiple incidents of harassment. Id. at 607, 626 A.2d
at 455. The court supported its proposition by illustrating that most cases of hostile
work environment sexual harassment involve incidents that, when taken alone, would
not meet the requisite level of severity but, when considered cumulatively, would be
sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile environment. Id. (citation omitted); see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (noting that "the required showing of severity or seriousness of
the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct"); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that
"'each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created may exceed the sum
of the individual episodes'") (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
124 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 607-11, 626 A.2d at 455-57.
125 See id at 607-08, 626 A.2d at 455-56.
126 Id. at 608, 626 A.2d at 456 (citations omitted); see Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan
Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (9th Cir.
1991); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v.
Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1988); Minteer v. Auger, 844 F.2d
569, 570 (8th Cir. 1988); Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir 1985).
127 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 608, 626 A.2d at 455-56 (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff must prove psychological injury in order to
succeed in a Title VII hostile work environment sexual harassment action). In
Rabidue, Vivienne Rabidue, the plaintiff, was subjected to continuous demeaning and
degrading sexual behavior by her supervisor, Doug Henry. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Henry regularly voiced anti-female obscenities, constantly using such terms as "'whores,'" "'cunt,'" "'pussy,'" and "'tits.'" Id. In
addition, the judge acknowledged that Henry specifically remarked about the plain-
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LAD sought to prevent psychological damage of harassment victims, it was also tailored to alleviate other personal hardships.1 2 8 If
recovery was limited only to situations where serious psychological
harm had occurred, the court maintained, the LAD's remedial
function would not adequately be served.12 9 Thus, the majority
ruled that the conduct of the harasser, and not the injury to the
or pervasive to state an acplaintiff, had to be adequately 3severe
0
tionable claim under the LAD.1
tiff, "'All that bitch needs is a good lay,'" and referred to her as "'fat ass.'" Id. Despite
this blatant harassment, the majority surprisingly held that the "obscenities, although
annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff
or other female employees." Id. at 622. In addition, the majority commended and
quoted the district court below, which stated:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes,
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was
not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgotten that
Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite
different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers. Clearly, the
Court's qualification is necessary to enable 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (3) to
function as a workable judicial standard.
Id. at 620-21 (citing Rabidue, 584 F. Supp at 430).
Judge Keith, in the dissenting portion of his separate opinion, characterized
Doug Henry's views as "primitive," and stated that they indeed created an anti-female
atmosphere. Id. at 625 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus,
Judge Keith expressed the firm conviction that the majority erred in ruling that
Henry's conduct did not create an anti-female work environment. Id. at 623 (Keith,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 608-09, 626 A.2d at 456. A National Organization of Women attorney, Anne Clark, stressed that psychological damage should not be the standard in sexual harassment cases. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 88. Clark proclaimed that
"'[y]ou shouldn't have to suffer a nervous breakdown before you can make a claim.'"
Id. The LAD cites other specific sufferings that warrant redress:
The Legislature further finds that because of discrimination, people suffer personal hardships, and the State suffers a grievous harm. The personal hardships include: economic loss; time loss; physical and
emotional stress; and in some cases severe emotional trauma, illness,
homelessness or other irreparable harm resulting from the strain of employment controversies; relocation, search and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by lack of information, uncertainty, and resultant planning
difficulty; career, education, family and social disruption; and adjustment problems, which particularly impact on those protected by this
act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993).
129 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 609, 626 A.2d at 456. Additionally, the court reasoned that
discrimination in the form of sexual harassment "'threatens not only the rights and
proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic State.'" Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West
1993)).
130 Id. at 609-10, 626 A.2d at 456; accord Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (holding that plain-
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The court further noted that in cases where psychological
harm does arise, the extent of the plaintiff's injury would factor
into damage calculations but would not be used as an element of
the cause of action."3 ' Additionally, the court observed, this new
standard would not require a victim to show economic loss and
would allow a plaintiff to recover in situations
where the harassing
32
her.1
towards
directed
not
was
conduct
Addressing the third element of the newly-created standard,
the Lehmann court determined that in an action for hostile work
environment sexual harassment, the fact finder should analyze the
issue from the perspective of a reasonable woman. 3 3 Justice Garibaldi, in reasoning for the majority, noted that an objective, gender-specific standard was the most appropriate analysis for sexual
harassment litigation. 3 4 The majority posited that a reasonabletiffs do not have to be subjected to harassment until they are seriously affected psychologically in order to bring an actionable claim under Title VII). See also Carrero v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that an employee does not have to endure degrading and demeaning conduct on a continuing,
long-term basis before being protected by Title VII remedies).
131 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 610, 626 A.2d at 457.
132 Id. at 610-11, 626 A.2d at 457. The court instructed that a plaintiff, in order to
show that her work environment was hostile, could use evidence demonstrating that
other employees of the same sex were harassed. Id. at 611, 626 A.2d at 457. The
court recognized that witnessing the harassment of same-sex employees would reinforce a plaintiff's perception that her work environment has become hostile. Id. See,
e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the defendant's harassment of other employees who were working in close proximity to the
plaintiff, was directly relevant to the issue of whether a hostile environment was created in violation of Title VII).
133 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 611-12, 626 A.2d at 457-58. In the less frequent cases where
the plaintiff is male, the court instructed, a reasonable man standard would apply. Id.
at 612, 626 A.2d at 458. Some legal commentators have criticized the use of a reasonable woman standard. See, e.g., Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable"Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence,87 Nw. U. L. REv. 326
(1992). Unikel rejected the legal usage of the reasonable woman standard as socially
undesirable, legally inappropriate, and practically ineffective. Id. at 370. The author
commented that:
because the reasonable woman standard explicitly focuses on a person's
gender group membership and implicitly requires that 'reasonableness'
be applied in a manner that reflects the totality of a person's group
affiliations, the standard effectively adopts a group rights perspective.
Such a perspective is fundamentally inconsistent with the individualistic
principle of formal equality that underlies the American legal system as
a whole and the reasonableness principle in particular."
Id. See supra notes 19 and 111 for a further discussion of the reasonable woman
standard.
134 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 612, 626 A.2d at 458. Judge Damon Keith, in his critical
dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., has generally been credited with the advent
of the reasonable woman standard in case law. Penny L. Cigoy, Comment, Harmless
Amusement or Sexual Harassment?: The Reasonableness Of The Reasonable Woman Standard,
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ness standard would better serve the LAD's goal of eliminating discriminatory behavior because the courts would now focus on the
legality of the defendant's conduct, rather than on the plaintiff's
subjective reactions.'
Additionally, the majority elucidated that
as society's perception of sexual harassment continues to evolve,
the flexible reasonable woman standard would also continue to
13 6

develop.

The court dictated that only one type of claim would be
barred by employing the reasonable woman standard. 3 7 Idiosyncratic responses by overly-sensitive plaintiffs to behavior that would
not be considered harassing to an objective woman, the court rea138
soned, would not state a valid claim under this new standard.
Conversely, the court announced, this flexible standard would also
enable a "tough and resilient" plaintiff to recover for conduct that
she did not consider harassing, but when objectively viewed, the
behavior would be deemed sufficiently
offensive and severe to cre139
ate a hostile work environment.
In support of the adoption of a gender-specific test, the court
recognized that inherent differences in male and female perspectives exist on sexual harassment in the workplace. 4 ° A reasonable
20 PEPP. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (1993) (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d
611, 623-28 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)). See supra note 127 for an analysis of Judge Keith's
dissent.
Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 612, 626 A.2d at 458.
136 Id. The court acknowledged, however, that incorporating
135

society's views
through the use of a reasonable woman standard could also pose certain dangers. Id.
The court noted that the LAD, as remedial legislation, was concerned with changing
standards of conduct. Id. By employing a reasonableness standard, the majority
warned, courts should not hold that existing levels of discrimination are per se reasonable or that reasonable women would expect sexual harassment when employed
in a male-dominated work environment. Id.
137 Id. at 613, 626 A.2d at 458.
138 Id. at 613-14, 636 A.2d at 458-59. The court stated, however, that these subjective reactions would have relevancy when determining compensatory damages. Id. at
613, 626 A.2d at 458. The court further observed that such subjective responses were
not an element of the cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment. Id.
139 Id.

140 Id at 614-15, 626 A.2d at 459. Legal analysts have also noted these differing
gender perspectives in the workplace, and the interaction of men and women at work
has come under close scrutiny. See, e.g., Anne C. Levy, Sexual Harassment Cases in the
19 9 0s: 'Backlashing" the "Backlash" Through Title VII, 56 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 50 (1992).
Levy maintained that although people may observe sexual interplay as a form of
harmless amusement between men and women, this behavior has more serious undertones. Id. Levy postulated that it is more accurate to categorize this interplay as
an attempt by men, the gender with organizational power, to keep women in their
historically subordinate role. Id.
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person standard, the majority argued, would ignore this distinction
and focus on the male perspective, which the court maintained is
viewed by society as more normal.1 4 ' The court concluded that
when fact finders apply this standard, they must be cognizant and
142
respectful of these different gender perspectives.
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that once the elements
of sexual harassment have been established against a supervisor, it
must be determined whether the employer can be held vicariously
liable for its supervisor's harassing conduct.' 4 3 The majority noted
that the court had not addressed this issue subsequent to the
LAD's 1990 amendment, which made all common law tort remedies available to superior court plaintiffs. 144 Justice Garibaldi
Another commentator has observed that men generally perceive sexual conduct
and comments as "harmless amusement." Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1203 (1989). The author
asserted that whereas men tend to find sexual conduct directed towards them as flattering or harmless, women are more likely to view such behavior as intimidating and
hostile. Id. at 1205-06 (citing BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 47-54 (1985)).
141 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 614, 626 A.2d at 459. The court explained that a possible
reason for the difference in gender perspectives is that women are subjected to a
society replete with sexual violence. Id. at 615, 626 A.2d at 459. Thus, the court
noted, women may view sexual behavior in an inappropriate setting as menacing. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that this issue was squarely addressed by
the Fifth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady. Id. (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991)). The Lehman court noted the Ellison court's statement that:
[B]ecause women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may
understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude
to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault,
may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the
social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may
perceive.
Id. (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879).
142 Id. The court also addressed the concern that women have been a minority in
many workplace settings. Id. Due to this status, the court reasoned, it is more difficult
for women to gain recognition and credibility among co-workers, and can result in a
loss of self-confidence and interfere with employment advancement and success. Id.
(citing Abrams, supra note 140, at 1208-09.)
143 Id. at 615-16, 626 A.2d at 459-60.
144 Id. at 616, 626 A.2d at 460 (citations omitted). The court cited the LAD amendment, which states in pertinent part that "[ulpon the application of any party, ajury
trial shall be directed to try the validity of any claim under this act specified in this
suit. All remedies available in common law tort actions shall be available to prevailing
plaintiffs." Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (West 1993)). Prior to 1990, the court
noted, some compensatory relief was afforded to plaintiffs under the LAD. Id. (citing
Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 125-28, 253 A.2d 793, 800-01 (1969); Gray v.
Serutto Builders, 110 N.J. Super. 297, 317, 265 A.2d 404, 415 (Ch. Div. 1970)). The
Lehmann court illustrated, however, that the main form of available relief for pre-1990
LAD violations was equitable in nature. Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 616, 626 A.2d at 460
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agreed with the opinion of the appellate division in finding that an
employer should be held strictly liable for equitable damages and
relief resulting from a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee.1 45 The LAD's curative purpose of abolishing workplace
harassment and discrimination, the court reasoned, would best be
served by holding an employer directly responsible for restoring an
employee to her pre-harassment status quo.1 46 The majority elucidated that the employer is not only the party with the power to
to imeffectuate such remedial restoration, but is also best suited
1 47
pose measures to prevent future workplace harassment.
Alternatively, the majority recognized that different considerations should apply in assessing employer liability standards for compensatory damages 148 because the employer is not the only party
(citing Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 436-37, 561 A.2d 1130, 1132-33
(1989)).
Similarly, commentators have noted that the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act on the federal level has increased the potential for recovery in sexual harassment
actions. See, e.g., Terry M. Dworkin, Harassment in the 1990s, BUSINESS HORIZONS, Mar.Apr. 1993, at 55. Dworkin noted that the passage of this bill was facilitated by the
public awareness generated from the Hill-Thomas hearings. Id. One year earlier,
President Bush had vetoed an almost identical bill, terming it a quota bill. Id. After
the bill was reintroduced in 1991, Bush again threatened to use his veto power. Id.
Dworkin stated, however, that soon after the debates Bush deserted the quota objections and signed the bill into law. Id.
According to Dworkin, the Act increased the available remedies for employment
discrimination victims by allowing employees to sue for compensatory and punitive
damages, along with the standard equitable relief afforded by Title VII. Id. Prior to
the 1991 Act, injunctive relief was the main Title VII remedy. Id. Pursuant to the
1991 Act, Dworkin noted that damages included recovery for emotional pain and
suffering and other nonpecuniary losses. Id. Additionally, the author recognized that
the Act made jury trials available to plaintiffs seeking damages. Id. Because juries are
presumed to favor the employee side of litigation, this new measure would have a
great impact upon a victim's recovery. See id.
145 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 616-17, 626 A.2d at 460. The court set forth a non-exclusive list of equitable damages: front and/or back pay, hiring or reinstating the
harassed employee, discharging, disciplining, or transferring the harasser, and taking
remedial and preventive measures at the workplace. Id.
146 Id. This strict liability standard for equitable damages and relief applies to cases
involving both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment committed by agents and supervisors. Id. at 617, 626 A.2d at 460; see also Harz & Lajewski,
supra note 11, at 12.
147 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 617, 626 A.2d at 460.
148 Compensatory damages are defined as those that:
will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing
more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the
wrong or injury. Damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm sustained by him. The rationale behind compensatory damages is to restore the injured party to the
position he or she was in prior to the injury."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
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capable of providing such relief.1 49 The court conformed with the
intentions and instructions of both the New Jersey Legislature and
the United States Supreme Court by holding that agency principles
should govern employer liability for compensatory damages. 5
Further, the court recognized that negligence, as set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, also provided an additional basis for
employer liability."' Although declining to set forth a specific negligence standard for sexual harassment claims, the court noted that
149 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at

617, 626 A.2d at 460.
150 Id. The court noted that the NewJersey Legislature amended the LAD to make
available all common law tort remedies. Id. See supra note 144 for a discussion of the
1990 LAD amendment. Judge Skillman, in the appellate opinion below, rendered the
following assertion as to the availability of compensatory damages: "I would conclude
that claims for any compensatory damages which are not equitable in nature should
be subject to common law rules of liability, including general principles of agency
law." T.L. v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 616, 660, 605 A.2d 1125, 1149 (App.
Div. 1992) (Skillman, J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover,
the NewJersey Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, suggested that agency principles should be applied to Titie VII
cases. Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 618, 626 A.2d at 461 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)). Justice Garibaldi further noted that the Meritor Court had
rejected an automatic, strict liability rule for hostile work environment supervisory
sexual harassment. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72). Although the Meritor Court
failed to issue a definitive standard for employer liability, Justice Garibaldi noted that
the Supreme Court did agree with the EEOC that Congress intended the courts to
employ agency principles for guidance in this field. Id. Specifically, the Lehmann
court quoted the following passage from the United States Supreme Court's Meritor
decision:
While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their
particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are
to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisors.
Id. (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72) (citation omitted)).
151 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 621, 626 A.2d at 462. Specifically, the court noted that
Section 219 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, which outlined a master's liability for the torts committed by a servant, mandated that:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id. at 619, 626 A.2d at 461-62 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219
(1958)).
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workplace sexual harassment would be considered foreseeable regardless of whether an employer has established and enforced antiharassment policies. 15 2 The absence of such policies, the court
warned, would provide strong evidence of negligent conduct by
153
the employer.
Finally, the majority addressed the issue of punitive damages,1 54 concluding that such damages would be awarded only in
cases demonstrating egregious conduct on the part of the wrongdoer. 1 55 An employer should be held liable for punitive damages,
the court instructed, only where upper management5 6participated
1
in the harassment or acted with willful indifference.
Subsequent to the Lehmann decision, the United States
152 Id. at 621, 626 A.2d at 462. The court elucidated that the absence of anti-harassment policies would not automatically give rise to negligence, and, conversely, the
presence of such mechanisms would not automatically shield an employer from liability. Id., 626 A.2d at 463. The majority recognized, however, that an employer could
establish evidence of due care by installing preventative mechanisms in the following
manner:
Employers that effectively and sincerely put five elements into place are
successful at surfacing sexual harassment complaints early, before they
escalate. The five elements are: policies, complaint structures, and that
includes both formal and informal structures; training, which has to be
mandatory for supervisors and managers and needs to be offered for all
members of the organization; some effective sensing or monitoring
mechanisms, to find out if the policies and complaint structures are
trusted; and then, finally, an unequivocal commitment from the top
that is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice.
Id. at 621-22, 626 A.2d at 463 (quotation omitted).
153 Id. at 622, 626 A.2d at 463.
154 Id. at 624, 626 A.2d at 464. Punitive, or exemplary damages:
are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and
above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the
wrong done to him was aggravated by the circumstances of violence,
oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of
the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental
anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil
behavior ....
[Plunitive or exemplary damages are based upon an entirely different public policy consideration-that of punishing the defendant or of setting an example for similar wrongdoers .... In cases in
which it is proved that a defendant has acted willfully, maliciously, or
fraudulently, a plaintiff may be awarded exemplary damages in addition
to compensatory or actual damages.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
155 Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 624-25, 626 A.2d at 464 (quoting Leimgruber v. Claridge
Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 454, 375 A.2d 652, 654 (1977)).
156 Id. at 625, 626 A.2d at 464 (citing Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774,
783 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that an employer, in an action for supervisory sexual
harassment, could be held liable when the employer participated in, ratified, or acquiesced in the wrongdoing)).
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Supreme Court recently addressed, for the second time, the issue
of workplace sexual haiassment. 15 7 Specifically, in Harrisv. Forklift
Systems, Inc., the Court was asked to resolve the conflict existing in
the federal circuit courts over whether a plaintiff should be required to show psychological damage before being able to recover
under Title VII. 15 s In arriving at the same conclusion as the Lehmann court, the United States Supreme Court held that for conduct to be actionable as hostile work environment sexual
harassment, the behavior need not affect the plaintiffs psychological well-being or cause her to suffer psychological injury.1 5 9 Thus,
by mirroring the standard set forth in Lehmann, the Supreme Court
resolved the division existing at the federal level on the psychologi157 Ham-is v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). See generally Toni Lester,
The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual HarassmentLaw-Will it Really Make a Difference?,
26 IND. L.J. 227 (1993). Lester noted that the Supreme Court issued its first sexual
harassment opinion in Meritor. Id. at 231 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986)). See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Meritor.
158 Harris,114 S. Ct. at 370. Theresa Harris was a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc.,
and Charles Hardy was the company's president. Id. at 369. Throughout Harris's
employment at Forklift, she was often subjected to unwanted sexual innuendos because of her gender. Id. On one occasion, Hardy, in front of a group of employees,
asked Harris to go to a hotel so they could negotiate her raise. Id. Hardy would also
ask female employees, including Harris, to retrieve coins from the front pocket of his
pants. Id. At other times he would throw objects in front of Harris and other women
and ask them to pick them up, and would also make sexual comments about Harris's
clothing. Id. Another time, when Harris was negotiating a deal with a Forklift customer, Hardy asked her, in front of her co-employees, "'What did you do, promise the
guy... some [sex] Saturday night?'" Id.
Hardy's behavior was not always overtly sexual in nature, but rather sexist and
derogatory towards the female gender. See id. On various occasions, in front of Harris's associates, Hardy stated, "'You're a woman, what do you know,' and 'We need a
man as the rental manager,'" and on at least one occasion referred to her as a "'dumb
ass woman.'" Id.

See supranotes 127-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit court
division over the psychological damage issue.
159 Id. at 371. The district court below held that Hardy's actions did not create a
hostile environment because, although some of his behavior offended Harris, and
would offend a reasonable woman, it was not "'so severe as to be expected to seriously
affect [Harris's] psychological well-being.'" Id. at 369-70 (quoting the district court
opinion) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that Title VII was
not limited to economic or tangible discrimination. Id. at 370 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 64). Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the Court's decision was a compromise between making actionable any offensive conduct, and requiring the conduct to result in psychological injury. Id. at 370. The Court further
instructed that Title VII would come into play, and a defendant's behavior would be
deemed harassing, before a plaintiff suffers a nervous breakdown. Id.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, stated that the "abusive" or "hostile"
standard adopted in the Meritor decision was vague. Id at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Further, the Justice proclaimed that "no test [is] more faithful to the inherently vague
statutory language than the one the Court today adopts," and for those reasons concurred with the majority opinion. Id.
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cal damage issue, and held that as long as a work environment has
become abusive or hostile, a plaintiff does not have to prove psychological damage.160
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lehmann should
be applauded for its liberal and innovative stance on the issue of
sexual harassment. This new test will make it easier for a plaintiff
to prove a valid cause of action, as a result of both its objective,
reasonable woman standard, and also due to the ability of a plaintiff to recover without having to prove psychological injury.
The courtroom, however, is not the most effective arena for
ridding society of workplace sexual harassment. Realistically, in order to curb the worldwide"' problem of workplace sexual harassment, both management and employees need to restructure their
beliefs and policies. Mandatory harassment policies and grievance
procedures on the part of employers, coupled with required attendance for employees at educational and awareness seminars,
need to be implemented on the national level as a starting point
for the cure.
It is unrealistic, however, to assume that this problem will be
instantly remediated. One possible approach to the problem is for
an employer or company to implement mandatory, binding, and
final arbitration agreements for their employees. 6 2 This approach
would not only address the grievances much faster, but would also
serve to alleviate the increasing backlog of federal cases. By having
both the accused harasser and alleged victim actively participate
with management in the arbitration process, a more universal
awareness will be created in furtherance of the goal of reducing
the incidence of sexual harassment.
Some commentators believe that the sexual harassment problem will be cured through demographic realignment; it is proId. at 371.
See Dworkin, supra note 144, at 56. Dworkin observed that the worldwide struggle against sexual harassment has reached all corners of the globe. See id. For example, the author illustrated that Japanese courts have recently recognized that
country's first successful sexual harassment claim, and awarded 16 million yen to the
victim. Id. at 56-57. In Britain, the author maintained, where sexual harassment complaints have increased by 50%, the government has intervened with an anti-harassment campaign. Id. at 57. Additionally, Dworkin noted, harassing behavior has
become criminalized in some European Community countries. Id.
160
161

162 See ADR Seminar on Sexual Harassment, ARB. J., June 1993, at 23. An example

given in the seminar involved opposing parties who together select a joint investigatory team comprised of both a man and woman. Id. The parties then agreed on an
arbitration process involving two mediation sessions. Id. If unsuccessful, the plan
dictated, the mediating team would report to management who, upon request, would

issue a recommendation for action. Id.
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jected that by the year 2000 women will comprise nearly fifty
percent of the workforce. 16 3 This will have the resulting effect of
enabling women to influence the workplace and instill a more gender-neutral work environment. Hopefully, this will set in motion,
and eventually achieve, society's ultimate goal of completely eradicating sexually hostile work environments.
Thomas E. Claps

163

See Dworkin, supra note 144, at 56.

